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DEFINING “DEVELOPING COUNTRY” IN 
THE SECOND COMMITMENT PERIOD 
OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 
Will Gerber* 
Abstract: In 2005, negotiations began among parties to the U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change to lay the groundwork for what was 
to become the Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Prominent among the issues raised at this initial meeting in Montreal and 
those that followed, was that of whether rapidly industrializing developing 
countries would take on binding commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. As in the past, the G-77, the main representative body of devel-
oping countries, together with China, strongly opposed any kind of bind-
ing commitments. A closer look at the countries comprising the G-77 ne-
gotiating group reveals there are vast disparities in economic power and 
industrialization among them. This Note explores the wide gulf that has 
emerged between developing countries and suggests that developed 
countries may have to make difficult decisions about the structure of the 
Kyoto Protocol to secure commitments from industrializing countries. 
Introduction 
 On November 6, 2006, the Twelfth Session of the Conference of 
the Parties to the United Nations (U.N.) Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (COP 12) opened in Nairobi, Kenya.1 The purpose of 
                                                                                                                      
* Will Gerber is a Note Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative Law Re-
view. 
1 Pew Ctr. Global Climate Change, Twelfth Session of the Conference of the 
Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP 12 Report, 
http://pewclimate.com/what_s_being_done/in_the_world/cop12/summary.cfm (last vis-
ited May 14, 2008) [hereinafter COP 12 Report]. Between writing and publication of this 
Note the Thirteenth Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 13) took place in Bali, 
Indonesia on December 3–15, 2007. The primary accomplishment of this session was the Bali 
Action Plan, which provides a roadmap for negotiations over the next two years. This session 
did not, however, address the primary substantive issues raised by this Note, including nego-
tiation structure and binding commitments for the Second Commitment Period, and is thus 
not discussed in detail in this Note. See Int’l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Summary of the Thir-
teenth Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and Third Meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol: Dec. 3–15, 2007, 12 Earth Negotiations Bull. 354 (Dec. 18, 
2007), available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12354e.html [hereinafter Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin Summary]. 
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this meeting was to continue the work begun in Montreal the previous 
year to secure binding obligations for the Kyoto Protocol’s second 
commitment period beginning in 2012.2 The negotiations leading up 
to this new period have focused largely on establishing new commit-
ments for developed countries and on the development of mechanisms 
that encourage greater involvement by developing countries in the cli-
mate regime.3 
 As in previous rounds of negotiations, parties to the convention 
have arranged themselves into negotiating groups, each of which 
represents distinct interests.4 Not surprisingly, there is a clear divide 
between developed and developing nations in these negotiating 
groups.5 The most powerful group for developing nations is the Group 
of 77 (G-77), which, despite its name, has now expanded to 130 mem-
bers, including major players such as India.6 It has become increasingly 
clear that emission reduction commitments by members of the G-77 
will be necessary for the Kyoto Protocol to have a meaningful impact 
on climate change.7 The necessity of commitments by the G-77 be-
comes even more apparent when one considers the fact that China, 
though not an official member, has closely allied itself with the G-77 
and will be bound by the same obligations as members of the group.8 
Commitments by these countries, however, will be undoubtedly accom-
panied by a demand for a greater role in Kyoto Protocol policy-making.9 
To maintain the Protocol’s effectiveness and coherence, member na-
tions will have to form a new model for governance that rewards devel-
oping countries for taking on binding commitments with sacrifices of 
power by more developed nations.10 
 The negotiations of the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention (COP 11) in Montreal and the Twelfth Conference of the 
Parties (COP 12) in Nairobi, both looking toward the Kyoto Protocol’s 
second commitment period, are indicators of what this new power bal-
                                                                                                                      
2 See Earth Negotiations Bulletin Summary, supra note 1. 
3 See id. 
4 See David A. Wirth, The Sixth Session (Part Two) and Seventh Session of the Conference on 
the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 648, 649 (2002). 
5 See id. 
6 The Group of 77 at the United Nations, About the Group of 77, http://g77.org/doc 
(last visited May 14, 2007) [hereinafter About the Group of 77]. 
7 See, e.g., COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
8 See Wirth, supra note 4, at 649. 
9 See Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the Climate 54 
(Kevin A. Baumert ed., 2002). 
10 Id. 
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ance could look like.11 These meetings and the rounds of negotiations 
to follow will show whether the nations that have traditionally played 
the largest role in shaping the Protocol will acquiesce to the implemen-
tation of measures that effect power-sharing, or if they will fight to re-
tain control.12 
 To put these negotiations in context, Part I of this Note briefly ex-
amines the history of the Kyoto Protocol, focusing particularly on its 
approach to the participation of underdeveloped countries. Part II 
considers issues that have arisen under the Protocol’s original provi-
sions since its ratification. It goes on to gives a brief description of the 
first and second meetings of the parties to discuss obligations for the 
second commitment period, including a more in-depth look at innova-
tive suggestions for greater commitments for developing (non-Annex I) 
parties. Part III discusses the potential objections to each of the pro-
posed new mechanisms and assesses the chances for their success in 
holding developing countries to greater obligations if implemented. 
I. Background 
 The Kyoto Protocol is likely the most popularly recognized name 
in the field of climate change control.13 In the United States, the gov-
ernment’s official position on the Protocol typically evokes either out-
rage or indifference, neither of which leads to a true assessment of 
the potential for the program that is currently in place.14 
 The Kyoto Protocol is an outgrowth of the U.N. Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention), a convention 
that entered into force on March 21, 1994, under which the ratifying 
parties were to 
gather and share information on greenhouse gas emissions, 
national policies and best practices; launch national strategies 
for addressing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to ex-
pected impacts, including the provision of financial and tech-
                                                                                                                      
11 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
12 See Ctr. for Eur. Policy Studies, What 2nd Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol? 
Some Initial Views from Japan (Feb. 10, 2003), http://www.ceps.be/Article.php?article_ 
id=99 [hereinafter What 2nd Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol?]. 
13 Joanna Depledge, From Kyoto to Buenos Aires and Beyond, in Interlinkages: The Kyoto 
Protocol and the International Trade and Investment Regimes 7, 7 (W. Bradnee 
Chambers ed., 2001). 
14 See e.g., Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 Harv. 
Envtl. L. Rev. 177, 178–79 (2002). 
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nological support to developing countries; and cooperate in 
preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change.15 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was intended to effect a binding implementa-
tion of the principles set forth in the UNFCCC.16 The basic structure of 
the climate control regime is fairly simple.17 Of the 168 countries that 
ratified the Protocol, thirty-five developed countries (Annex I parties) 
committed themselves to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 
specified percentages ranging up to eight percent between the years 
2008 and 2012.18 The overall goal was a minimum five percent reduc-
tion in global greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels.19 
 Although the Annex I parties were to bear the greatest responsibil-
ity for emissions reductions, the remaining parties were also given a 
role under the Protocol.20 These countries, largely referred to as “de-
veloping nations,” were to be involved in the climate regime through 
programs such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which 
involved allowing developed countries to offset their own emissions 
with emission-reduction programs in developing countries, as well as 
technology sharing.21 Both of these programs are voluntary for devel-
oping countries that are not otherwise burdened by any real binding 
commitments.22 The original rationale for this exemption for develop-
ing countries was that developed countries introduce a disproportion-
ate amount of greenhouse gas into the environment and should there-
fore be required to address their emissions before developing countries 
will be required to make their own commitments.23 This calculus is rap-
idly changing, though, and some studies have shown that greenhouse 
gas emissions by developing nations will surpass those of developed 
countries as early as 2020.24 A prime example of this trend is China, 
                                                                                                                      
15 UNFCCC, Essential Background, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/ 
2877.php (last visited May 14, 2007) [hereinafter UNFCCC, Essential Background]. 
16 See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php 
(last visited May 14, 2007). 
17 See id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 See Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the Equitable Principle of Common but Differentiated Re-
sponsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global Cli-
mate Change Context, 13 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 473, 484 (2002). 
21 Kevin A. Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate 
Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 365, 384 (2006). 
22 Id. 
23 Weisslitz, supra note 20, at 483–84. 
24 Michael Stavins, Forging a More Effective Global Climate Treaty, Env’t, Dec. 2004, at 23, 
25. 
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which is still pegged as a “developing” nation even though it is pro-
jected to pass the United States as the number one emitter of carbon 
dioxide by the year 2025.25 
 Given that the first commitment period was planned to last only 
until 2012, provisions were included in the Protocol establishing nego-
tiation meetings to assess climate developments during the previous 
period and to discuss means to address evolving environmental needs.26 
Article 3, paragraph 9 provides that commitments for subsequent peri-
ods are to be determined through meetings called Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs) commencing at least seven years before the end of each 
commitment period.27 
 In November 2005, COP 11 convened to consider the climate re-
gime’s second period in light of lessons learned from implementation 
of the Protocol up to that time.28 Two major steps bearing on the fu-
ture of the Kyoto Protocol were taken at this meeting.29 First, the par-
ties established a new working group to discuss future commitments of 
the developed countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol.30 Sec-
ond, the parties instituted a dialogue on “strategic approaches for long-
term global cooperative action to address climate change.”31 This dia-
logue will primarily take the form of several scheduled workshops in-
tended to examine the evolving environmental situation.32 The parties’ 
decision establishing these workshops provides that each will be mod-
erated by two facilitators, one chosen by Annex I parties from among 
their ranks, and the other chosen by the non-Annex I parties out of 
their own group.33 
                                                                                                                      
25 Yingling Liu, Worldwatch Inst., Chinese Power Giant to Sell Carbon Dioxide to Spain Un-
der CDM Contract ( Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3876. 
26 See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Dec. 10 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (2008). 
27 Id. 
28 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Press Release, Secretariat, Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations 
Climate Change Conference Agrees on Future Critical Steps to Tackle Climate Change (Dec. 
10, 2005), available at http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_      
advisories/application/pdf/press051210_cop11.pdf. 
33 UNFCCC, Dialogue on Long-Term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change by 
Enhancing Implementation of the Convention, Decision 1/CP.11 (Dec. 10, 2005) available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_11/application/pdf/cop11_00_dialogue_on_long-
term_coop_action.pdf [hereinafter UNFCCC, Dialogue]. 
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 The parties took further steps toward the next commitment period 
at COP 12 in Nairobi, Kenya in early November 2006.34 Although the 
first dialogue session had taken place in Bonn in May 2006, the results 
of that meeting were not the main focus of COP 12.35 Center stage was 
instead taken by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s introduction of 
what has been dubbed the Nairobi Framework (the Framework).36 This 
program’s explicit purpose is to encourage developing countries to 
participate in the Kyoto Protocol.37 The Framework draws together sev-
eral different U.N. agencies including the U.N. Development Pro-
gramme, the U.N. Environment Programme, the World Bank Group, 
the African Development Bank, and the UNFCCC, all of which will 
work to find means to involve primarily African countries in the 
CDMs.38 
II. Discussion 
 Since the Protocol was ratified, concerns about its implementation 
have haunted parties to the convention.39 The issues raised throughout 
the life of the Protocol often reflect a sharp divide between the devel-
oped and developing world.40 The two groups have frequently dis-
agreed on their respective roles in the future implementation of the 
Protocol and the commitments that should be made by each, as illus-
trated by the latest round of negotiations.41 
 Japan’s concerns about the Protocol’s implementation are repre-
sentative of those of many developed countries.42 Japan argues that its 
domestic system of pollution reduction is already much more efficient 
and effective than those of most other countries. For this reason it will 
be much more difficult for Japan to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
by the same percentage as other countries whose pollution reduction 
processes are much less efficient.43 While these less efficient countries 
may take basic and inexpensive steps to meet their reduction goal, Japan 
                                                                                                                      
34 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 See Weisslitz, supra note 20, at 484–85. 
40 Id. 
41 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
42 See What 2nd Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol?, supra note 12. 
43 Id. 
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will be forced to spend far more for complex research and implementa-
tion to reach a similar target for greenhouse gas reductions.44 
 Other developed countries have also recognized that their emission 
reduction efforts will result in similar diminishing returns and that na-
tions in the process of industrialization are in a better position to have a 
substantial impact on reducing greenhouse gas pollution.45 For in-
stance, during the second round of dialogue, held in Nairobi in No-
vember 2006, Elliot Diringer, from the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change, gave a presentation pointing out that some “developing” coun-
tries that are affiliated with the G-77, such as China, India, Brazil, and 
Indonesia, are among the top twenty-five nations for both GDP and total 
emissions.46 Some commentators believe, given these facts, it is time for 
larger developing countries to make meaningful commitments, espe-
cially because some projections show that developing countries will be 
responsible for half the world’s emissions by 2020 or earlier.47 
A. What Are “Developed” and “Developing” Nations? 
 A large share of the tension between “developed” and “develop-
ing” nations arises from the uncomfortable clustering of nations in 
their negotiating blocs.48 These odd arrangements of countries are 
partly due to the fact that the Convention on Climate Change does not 
precisely define the terms “developed” and “developing” that have 
come to drive much of the debate concerning the Kyoto Protocol.49 
The Convention also contains no provision whereby a nation must take 
on responsibilities similar to those of its equals in terms of economic 
capabilities or greenhouse gas emissions.50 Thus, some developing par-
ties that have developed rapidly since ratification have become equals 
or surpassed some developed nations in terms of economic prowess or 
emissions, and yet remain aligned with much smaller and less devel-
                                                                                                                      
44 Id. 
45 See Stavins, supra note 24, at 25. 
46 Elliot Diringer, Pew Ctr. on Global Climate Change, Presentation at the UNFCCC Dia-
logue Long-Term Cooperative Action to Address Climate Change, International Climate 
Efforts Beyond 2012, Nov. 16, 2006, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/dialogue/ 
items/3759.php. 
47 See Stavins, supra note 24, at 25. 
48 See Wirth, supra note 4, at 649. 
49 See Baumert, supra note 21, at 382. 
50 See Kevin A. Baumert & Christina Figueres, International Institute for Sus-
tainable Development, Issues and Options: The Kyoto Protocol’s Second Com-
mitment Period 7 (2003). 
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oped countries that bear lesser burdens under the Protocol.51 This is 
particularly true in the G-77, where seriously under-industrialized na-
tions, many of them in Africa, are lumped together with rapidly indus-
trializing countries like China and India.52 One explanation for this 
curious grouping is that less industrialized countries believe they lack 
the economic clout to negotiate effectively.53 It is thus useful to have 
powerful countries like China on one’s side jockeying for position with 
the larger European countries.54 
 Some commentators point to significant incongruities between the 
arguments made on behalf of developing nations and the realities of 
the modern global economy.55 One argument developing countries 
advanced against binding commitments is that such commitments 
would impose unduly burdensome costs, putting them at a significant 
economic disadvantage and hindering their further economic devel-
opment.56 Some see this as difficult to reconcile with the facts discussed 
above, namely that several of the G-77 members are among the nations 
with the greatest GDP.57 These countries are already major players in 
the global economy, and some believe they should be treated as such 
under the Kyoto Protocol’s climate control regime.58 
 Nonetheless, some major economies in the G-77 are starting to 
recognize their changing role under the Protocol and are attempting 
to establish domestic programs that reflect their responsibility for 
worldwide emissions, which they hope will spare them global disappro-
bation.59 For instance, in the second round of dialogue leading up to 
the Protocol’s second commitment period, China presented a compre-
hensive plan for resource conservation that involves several advanced 
technologies such as nuclear and bio-energy projects.60 These programs 
alone distinguish China from a large number of its fellow G-77 nations, 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Wirth, supra note 4, at 649. 
52 See Albert Mumma, The Poverty of Africa’s Position at the Climate Change Convention Ne-
gotiations, 19 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 181, 199 (2001). 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Weisslitz, supra note 20, at 484–85. 
56 Id. 
57 See Diringer, supra note 46. 
58 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
59 See Gao Guansheng, Office of Nat’l Coordination Comm. on Climate Change, National 
Development and Reform Commission of P.R. China, UNFCCC Second Workshop of Dialogue 
on Long-term Cooperative Action (Nov. 15, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/files/ 
meetings/dialogue/application/vnd.ms-powerpoint/061115_cop12_dial_3.pps#256. 
60 See id. 
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many of which are decades away from considering these types of ad-
vanced energy resources.61 
 The disparity in advanced resource options among G-77 countries 
arises in part from vast wealth differentials within the group of na-
tions.62 For example, Burundi, a party to the Kyoto Protocol and a 
member of the G-77, has a GDP of $5.78 billion, which pales in com-
parison to China’s GDP of $10.17 trillion.63 Another indicator of 
wealth, per capita GDP, shows that China is more than eleven times as 
wealthy as Burundi and nearly eight times as wealthy as Ethiopia, an-
other G-77 member.64 South Africa, which held the G-77 Chairmanship 
in 2006, has a per capita GDP that is nineteen times that of Burundi 
and thirteen times that of Ethiopia.65 
 Despite the economic heterogeneity of the G-77, the group re-
mains intact and maintains a unified front against any type of binding 
commitment.66 In China’s presentation discussed above, its spokesman 
stressed the country’s status as a developing nation and its dependence 
on industrialized nations for technology and financing.67 Conspicu-
ously absent from China’s proposals was any mention of any type of 
binding commitment for itself or any other members of the G-77.68 
China continues to argue that climate control needs should be met 
through binding commitments by Annex I parties to make further 
emissions reductions while these countries at the same time promise to 
provide greater aid to developing nations in implementing voluntary 
programs.69 This was made very clear in China’s written submission to 
the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group Further Commitments 
                                                                                                                      
61 See About the Group of 77, supra note 6. 
62 See id. 
63 See Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: China, https://www.cia.gov/li- 
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (last visited May 14, 2008) [hereinafter 
World Factbook: China]. 
64 See Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Burundi, https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/by.html (last visited May 14, 2008) 
[hereinafter World Factbook: Burundi]; World Factbook: China, supra note 63; Cent. Intel-
ligence Agency, World Factbook: Ethiopia, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/et.html (last visited May 14, 2008) [hereinafter World Factbook: 
Ethiopia]. 
65 See World Factbook: Burundi, supra note 64; World Factbook: Ethiopia, supra note 
64; Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: South Africa, https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html (last visited May 14, 2008). 
66 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
67 See Guansheng, supra note 59. 
68 See id. 
69 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
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for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG).70 This paper 
stated that “no new commitment . . . shall be introduced for Parties not 
included in Annex I to the Convention.”71 Presumably, this prohibition 
would encompass voluntary as well as mandatory commitments by de-
veloping nations.72 
B. Potential Methods of Differentiation Among Developing Countries 
 Several mechanisms have been suggested that would allow some 
differentiation among the G-77 countries according to their respective 
economic strength and technological capacities.73 For instance, Robert 
Stavins, director of the Harvard Environmental Economics Program, 
has suggested there should be a trigger mechanism whereby binding 
commitments would be required of parties to the Kyoto Protocol once 
their per capita GDP reaches a certain level.74 He does not suggest an 
exact threshold amount, but one could expect that wealthier non-
Annex I countries like South Africa and Brazil would fall under this 
provision.75 This system might require some refinement since per cap-
ita GDP is not a perfect measurement of economic resources available 
to improve industrial processes in all countries.76 In China, for exam-
ple, a large portion of the population is engaged in low-profit agricul-
ture in outlying areas, bringing the overall per capita GDP (combining 
agriculture, industry, and services) down significantly.77 The industrial 
sector alone, however, generates about five times as much value as the 
agricultural sector, most of which will be put back into industry rather 
than distributed to the outlying areas.78 This parsing of the data shows 
that there may be far greater resources for technological improvements 
than overall per capita GDP indicates.79 Although imperfect, Stavins’ 
theory is at least a starting point, and if put into place, could force sev-
                                                                                                                      
70 See UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, 1st Session, May 17–25, 2006, Views Regarding Article 3, Para-
graph 9, of the Kyoto Protocol, at 9, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/MISC.1 (2006), 
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2006/awg1/eng/misc01.pdf. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 See Stavins, supra note 24, at 25. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See World Factbook: China, supra note 63. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
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eral countries to take a more active role in reducing the effects of 
greenhouse gas emissions.80 
 Another mechanism to distinguish more industrially advanced 
countries from less developed nations would be to allow countries to 
voluntarily impose binding commitments on themselves.81 Under the 
Protocol’s provisions there are two ways in which a developing, non-
Annex I party may add itself to Annex I.82 The first pathway is found in 
article 4.2(g) of the Convention, which allows developing countries to 
become Annex I parties by notifying the U.N. Secretary-General, who 
also serves as the Depositary to the Convention.83 Second, the develop-
ing nation may submit its name to the COP for addition to Annex I 
through an amendment to the Annex.84 This is far more demanding 
because a formal amendment requires a three-fourths majority vote by 
all parties to the Convention.85 As discussed below, the difficulty in ob-
taining such a vote is due not to opposition from Annex I parties, but 
from other developing nations who believe that voluntary binding 
commitments taken on by other developing countries will put pressure 
on non-committing countries to follow suit.86 
 Even after a developing nation has become an Annex I party, they 
still do not have the privileges of many of the developed nations—such 
as emissions trading—until their names are added to Annex B, which 
contains the emission-reduction commitments for each industrialized 
country.87 Only a formal amendment will add the party’s name to this 
Annex so that it may actually be bound by its stated commitment, and 
the written consent of each party affected by the amendment must be 
obtained.88 Once again, other developing nations are reluctant to give 
their written consent, fearing that by doing so they open themselves to 
pressure to make their own voluntary commitments.89 
 This voluntary route to binding obligations may not appear to have 
any real potential at first blush, given the procedural complications de-
scribed above, and because it would seem that it is not in the interest of 
non-Annex I parties to submit themselves to additional scrutiny when 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Stavins, supra note 24, at 25. 
81 See Baumert, supra note 21, at 392. 
82 See Building on the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at 42–43. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
87 See Building on the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at 43. 
88 Id. 
89 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
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they already enjoy the benefits of Kyoto without any binding commit-
ments.90 This approach, however, has already been attempted by Ka-
zakhstan, most likely spurred by the possibility of economic advantage to 
be gained from emissions trading.91 Kazakhstan’s attempt to add itself to 
the list of Annex I parties, however, was met with stiff opposition from 
major developing countries that, reportedly, feared setting an unfavor-
able precedent.92 In theory, permitting these countries to add them-
selves to the list of Annex I parties would place other developing nations 
with similar or better capabilities under pressure to make similar com-
mitments.93 Despite this obstacle, the issue of voluntary commitments 
continues to be the subject of active debate at the meetings of the par-
ties.94 The possibility was raised again at COP 12 in Nairobi, where the 
issue was deferred to an AWG workshop scheduled for May 2007.95 
III. Analysis 
 According to the Pew Climate Center’s official report on the COP 
12 proceedings, developed countries advocated for a firm date for a 
second review of the Protocol, which they hoped would show that An-
nex I commitments alone would be inadequate to effect significant 
protection of the environment.96 This movement, along with the intro-
duction of the Nairobi Framework during COP 12, exhibits the parties’ 
understanding that developing countries must take a bigger role in the 
climate regime.97 
A. Obstacles to Expansion of Annex I 
 As discussed above, some commentators believe the most effective 
means to ensure consistent participation would be to convince develop-
ing countries to join Annex I and thus make binding commitments to 
reduce their emissions.98 Without these commitments, there are too 
few consequences for delay or noncompliance.99 Given the current 
structure of the Protocol, however, there are few incentives for develop-
                                                                                                                      
90 See Building on the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, at 42–43. 
91 Id. at 44. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 See COP 12 Report, supra note 1. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 See Weisslitz, supra note 20, at 489–90. 
99 Id. 
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ing countries to take on greater responsibilities.100 If developed coun-
tries attempted to impose commitments on the non-Annex I parties, 
they would run the risk of upsetting the delicate balance, which has 
been struck that allows over 160 countries with vastly diverse needs to 
agree to a single convention.101 There is the possibility that developing 
countries would view this type of action as heavy-handed and would be 
less likely to cooperate even in Kyoto’s voluntary programs, such as the 
CDM, for fear it would trap them into unforeseen responsibilities.102 
 If developing countries are to give up their freedom under the 
Protocol, they will require meaningful incentives and strong assurances 
from developed nations.103 For instance, developing countries are wary 
of accepting commitments under the climate regime because they are 
afraid it will hinder their efforts to compete with major Western 
economies.104 Furthermore, many of the least developed parties to the 
Protocol are concerned that binding obligations could inhibit their 
ability to fight the war on poverty by impeding their modernization ef-
forts.105 Given these concerns, it is likely developing nations would re-
quire a safety-valve arrangement by which obligations could be relaxed 
if compliance with Kyoto commitments were having too severe an eco-
nomic impact on a developing country’s economy.106 
 Some observers believe that taking on concrete commitments will 
have exactly the opposite effect on smaller countries’ economies.107 
Commentators often take the long-term view, asserting that establishing 
more environmentally-sound practices now will serve developing na-
tions better in the future because they will be prepared for the envi-
ronmental crises that are sure to come.108 This idea is appealing for de-
veloped nations whose place in the world market is assured and who 
have the additional resources to focus their efforts on curbing climate 
change.109 The situation is somewhat different, however, for those 
countries trying to find a place for themselves in the global economy or 
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trying to fend off widespread poverty.110 Their needs are more immedi-
ate and they would likely have more difficulty accepting economic dis-
advantage in the short-term, even if it meant having a head-start on 
preparing for eventual environmental crises.111 The initial attraction to 
the Kyoto Protocol for these countries may have been the opportunity 
to act on the international stage or to acquire technologies from devel-
oped countries that would aid their economic development, not neces-
sarily the high ideals of curbing climate change.112 
 Likewise, developing countries might attempt to limit the conse-
quences of non-compliance with their Kyoto obligations so that eco-
nomic sanctions could not be used against these less powerful coun-
tries.113 It is crucial for nations seeking an equal footing with the 
world’s large economies that their markets not be compromised by ma-
jor players’ refusal to do business with them.114 Currently, developing 
nations can escape this risk and remain parties to the Protocol because 
they have no binding commitments, and therefore risk no conse-
quences for noncompliance.115 This is understandable because the 
penalties envisaged in the Marrakesh Accords could have a significant 
impact on a struggling nation.116 The Accords, a series of agreements 
passed at COP 7 that were intended to resolve ongoing implementation 
debates among UNFCCC parties, established a compliance regime for 
the Kyoto Protocol under which parties who do not meet their emis-
sions commitments may have penalties imposed on them such as re-
strictions against involvement in CDM projects and a thirty percent re-
duction in a country’s permitted annual emissions.117 Softening these 
stiffer consequences of noncompliance could be a difficult point for 
developed nations to concede because international disapprobation 
may not always be sufficient to bring a country into compliance.118 
 It is quite possible that developed countries would be willing to 
make allowances for less developed countries that genuinely have diffi-
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culties meeting their Kyoto obligations, possibly through some form of 
sliding scale arrangement.119 In most of these cases the stakes would be 
relatively low because many developing countries contribute little to 
the world’s greenhouse gas problem.120 Countries like China and India, 
however, contribute significantly to the world’s greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and missing the opportunity to hold them accountable for emis-
sions reductions would be a much greater blow to the objectives of the 
Kyoto framework because they would be able to release harmful 
amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere without any signifi-
cant consequences.121 
B. Reclassification of Parties to Reinvigorate Dialogue 
 There is a very real possibility that a separation between develop-
ing countries that are large and small greenhouse gas contributors 
would produce a more effective climate agreement by holding large 
contributors more accountable.122 One must consider, however, how 
this change might be implemented without threatening the developing 
nations’ sovereignty by forcing change on them.123 Achieving this goal 
may require a seismic shift in the structure of the agreement.124 For 
instance, to make the debate around the second commitment period 
more productive, the parties’ rhetoric would need to be recast in terms 
other than “developed” and “developing.”125 These labels have ex-
hausted their usefulness and should be replaced with designations that 
recognize finer distinctions among nations.126 The criteria for this new 
structure should focus more on factors such as technological capacity 
and greenhouse gas emissions rather than historical solidarity.127 The 
original designations also conjure up the old distinctions between the 
Western and non-Western world with the West taking the lead and aid-
ing the non-Western countries.128 This type of distinction should be 
eradicated as quickly as possible because developing nations fear the 
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Kyoto Protocol’s environmental policies are a new type of coloniza-
tion.129 In other words, less industrialized parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
believe that subjecting themselves to an enforcement regime under the 
Protocol would sacrifice too much of their sovereignty to developed 
nations who control the Protocol.130 The painful memory of living un-
der Western rule causes them to cling to their independence and be 
distrustful of a program like the Kyoto Protocol, which originates in the 
West and would give Western powers control over less powerful, devel-
oping countries.131 
C. Are Sweeping Changes Really Necessary? 
 Given the obstacles that must be overcome, one might ask whether 
it is necessary for developed nations to persuade high-emission develop-
ing countries to take on more binding commitments.132 One must con-
sider whether the effects of global climate change may be addressed suf-
ficiently through greater emission-reduction requirements for Annex I 
countries and through national programs voluntarily developed by high-
polluting developing countries.133 Some observers point to China’s do-
mestic environmental programs as proof that once developing member 
countries reach a certain level of industrialization, they will impose 
standards on themselves without outside enforcement.134 As discussed 
above, China presented some impressive programs for resource conser-
vation at the second AWG meeting.135 Reliance on this type of national 
initiative has its shortcomings.136 As Kevin Baumert observes, there is no 
real accountability for the implementation of these programs.137 Devel-
oping countries are given significant leeway under the Kyoto Protocol to 
determine how fully they will carry out their plans.138 Even the national 
communications required of developing nations need not contain exact 
descriptions of the nation’s environmental programs.139 These reports, 
which are the primary reporting obligation of developing nations, are 
designed to provide an opportunity for these countries to describe the 
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steps they are taking to curb their greenhouse gas emissions.140 In prac-
tice, however, they often contain only claims of existing programs with-
out any real detail.141 Consequently, it is possible that a country’s im-
pressive rhetoric will become hollow promises because there can be no 
meaningful enforcement by other parties to the Protocol.142 Reports 
have shown that this may be the case in China, where the halting of con-
struction on several high-polluting power plants elicited praise from the 
international community even though work on the plants quietly began 
again shortly thereafter.143 
 Even assuming that China is upholding its promises to carry out its 
national programs, there is no guarantee that other developing nations 
would be as cooperative when they reach a certain level of industrializa-
tion.144 There is reason to believe that China’s motives for cooperating 
with the Kyoto Protocol may not be as effective for other developing 
countries or even for China in the future.145 First, China has been un-
der international scrutiny from the beginning of the Protocol.146 China 
has been one of the major question marks in the structure of Kyoto.147 
Observers in practically every Western country have been waiting to see 
what conservation steps China is willing to take, placing substantial 
pressure on the country to march in step for fear of its economic ties 
being harmed if it does not.148 A related point is that China’s initiatives 
come at a time when the Western world is still very dominant industri-
ally and thus in a position to place this kind of economic pressure on 
countries like China.149 This will not always be the case, however, and 
the incentive for nations without binding obligations to create national 
programs for environmental protection may be diminished in the fu-
ture.150 Finally, China does not have the shadow of colonialism hanging 
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over it as do many developing nations.151 It remains to be seen what 
effect the history of Western domination will have on African parties to 
the UNFCCC, if and when they achieve significant industrial develop-
ment.152 One does not know whether they will take the initiative, like 
China, to create their own national programs for greenhouse gas emis-
sions reductions, or whether they will resist change because of their 
fear that greater involvement in the climate regime will hand over too 
much power to more developed Western nations.153 
Conclusion 
 Some commentators believe that nothing short of a complete 
overhaul of the Kyoto provisions will create a working agreement be-
tween developed and developing countries on the future of the Proto-
col.154 This will be very difficult for the Kyoto Protocol’s founding 
members to swallow because they fear that too many concessions will 
rob the Protocol of any real teeth.155 The outcome of negotiations lead-
ing up to the second commitment period will largely depend on 
whether more industrialized developing countries will accept the simi-
larities between themselves and the Annex I parties instead of perpetu-
ating the myth that they come to the table in the same position as im-
poverished African nations.156 The negotiations will require humility 
and flexibility by Annex I parties, who may be required to sacrifice 
some of their expectations for the climate regime to ensure its contin-
ued existence.157 International conventions always face the challenge of 
meeting widely diverse needs, but hopefully, as with other international 
agreements, the justice of Kyoto’s cause will prevail and the Protocol 
will remain intact.158 Countries like China give some reason for hope 
that developing nations will truly embrace the ideals of the agreement 
as they develop into major industrial players, and that even though 
Kyoto may evolve, it will prove to be an effective international tool for 
combating global climate change.159 
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